Question (2) Consider the game in which the following are commonly known. First, GasCo1 chooses between actions a and b. Then, with probability 1/3, GasCo2 observes which action GasCo1 has chosen and with probability 2/3 GasCo2 does not observe the action GasCo1 has chosen. In all cases (regardless of whether GasCo2 has observed GasCo1 chose a, or has observed GasCo1 chose b, or has not observed any action), GasCo2 chooses between actions α and β. The payoff of each player is 1 after (a, α) and (b, β) and 0 otherwise. a) Write the above game in extensive form. b) Write the above game in normal form. c) Is an equilibrium? Find it? d) Is there a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibirum? Find it.

Question (2) Consider the game in which the following are commonly known. First, GasCo1 chooses between actions a and b. Then, with probability 1/3, GasCo2 observes which action GasCo1 has chosen and with probability 2/3 GasCo2 does not observe the action GasCo1 has chosen. In all cases (regardless of whether GasCo2 has observed GasCo1 chose a, or has observed GasCo1 chose b, or has not observed any action), GasCo2 chooses between actions α and β. The payoff of each player

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